(chaps. 6-7), shows the prosecutor Lasch interrogating first Smith and then a forensic medical expert. The Lasch-Smith interaction, in particular, backfired to the same degree that Black's destructive cross-examination of Mercer was an electrifying success. The interchange, beginning with Lasch sarcastically asking the defendant for opinions, invites Smith—who in his testimony does not acknowledge the sarcasm—to assume the opinion-rendering role of the medical doctor. (Interactionally deep into the transformation and not extricating herself, Lasch even winds up addressing him this way, catching herself in mid-honorific.)

Section 4 consists of one chapter, "The Microdynamics of Legal Change," in which Matoesian argues for attention to matters such as he has exhibited in chapters 2–7 in understanding what is at issue in such rape trials. He argues a strong case that statutory and procedural reforms have been, in the main, unsuccessful precisely as a function of inattention to them. Reformers must recognize that the rape trial is a genre of ritual performance of a culture, much more than it is a legal-institutional mode of procedure for determining narratable "truth"; and, like all ritual, it is the density of bringing that culture into the participation framework that makes it effective in its, alas, still "patriarchal" order, such innovations as shield laws notwithstanding.

Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforcement. By Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. Pp. xii+218. $29.95.

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In 1998, two men beat James Byrd, Jr., bloody, tied him to their truck, and dragged him over the dark dusty roads of rural Texas until he died. That same year Matthew Shepard was severely beaten, tied up, and left to die in the Wyoming wilderness. Mr. Byrd's "offense" was being African-American; Mr. Shepard's was being gay. Their killers were convicted not merely of murder but of hate crimes—crimes motivated by hatred of a victim for an ascribed feature, for "being innately who they are" (p. 61).

Lynchings, assaults, rapes, and other abuses have been inflicted upon racial and ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian people, and women for a very long time, but the category "hate crime" is new. In this book, Jenness and Grattet trace how civil rights and other movement activists constructed this category, mobilized political support, and created a new "policy domain." Their analysis focuses mostly at the mezzo level of legislatures, courts, and law enforcement institutions where both the problem and the policy have been redefined and renegotiated.

While it is not clear that such crimes were increasing, a curious coalition of new social movements and the crime victims' movement successfully

made such claims and framed hate or bias crimes in legislative arenas. Their use of rights discourse proved decisive because its legitimacy was uncontested. Jenness and Grattet describe an accelerating diffusion of such laws. The first was passed in 1980; by 1999, all 50 states had them. Once the basic pedigree of the policy was established, hate crime laws were institutionalized, the trend being "homogenization" due to "path dependence" (p. 72).

The most debate occurred in the courts, particularly on the still-thorny issue of how to identify the essential ingredient in hate crimes, "motivation." Judges heard challenges concerning excessive vagueness and broadness, punishment of speech or discriminating against certain forms of speech, and preferential treatment of certain groups. But the net result of such cases, according to the authors, was the refinement of the scope of such laws, which, paradoxically, allowed further expansion of the hate crimes domain.

Predictably, law enforcement agencies initially resisted hate crime laws as unenforceable. Yet, soon enough they developed folk theories and typifications (a lá Sudnow's "normal crimes") that allowed them to police and prosecute hate crimes at about the same rate as most other crimes.

Jenness and Grattet have done prodigious research and woven a tight analysis of the origins, diffusion, and institutionalization of anti-hate crime laws. Their empirically detailed book will be a genuine resource for specialists and a useful adjunct text in advanced courses on the sociology of law, social problems, and public policy that deal with race, gender, and sexuality.

As with most good books, however, one is left with new questions. What, for example, do the authors make of their count showing that 20%-30% of hate crimes in the race category are antiwhite? Their institutional focus allowed an almost clinical dissection of social construction, diffusion, and homogenization processes. But this focus afforded less analytic attention to the broader political context in which the social movement framing, law-making, interpreting, and enforcing took place. What, for example, did pro-civil rights senators have to give up to, say, Jesse Helms to pass the hate crimes bill? Were there differences in content, interpretation, and enforcement across states depending on the percentage of Republicans, on which party's executive appointed judges, or on the concentration of hate groups? How much hate crime do other industrial democracies have, and what are they doing in response?

If the horrid essence of hate crimes is that they do not just harm victims but symbolically terrorize whole swaths of humanity, then it seems reasonable that society establish laws that symbolize its collective abhorrence of such acts. But what have been the consequences, intended and unintended, of these new laws? Have they actually deterred hate crimes? Will the spotlights on extreme forms of racism, sexism, and homophobia push the more quotidian manifestations of bias into the shadows?

Is there any sense in which hate crimes, whether increasing or decreas-

ing, should be understood as a backlash against the "rights revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s, which helped empower previously powerless groups? Conversely, is there reason to believe that the values expressed in anti-hate crime laws are being diffused in our culture?

Consider the following real-life example of community response to a hate crime: At 5 a.m. one December Sunday in 1996 in a small suburb outside Philadelphia, vandals smashed the Markovitz family's picture window to destroy an electric menorah they left lighted to celebrate Hanukkah. News of the incident traveled fast. By nightfall all the homes in the neighborhood, most of them not Jewish, had menorahs in their windows. Local stores ran out of menorahs. "It just grew," said one of the Catholic neighbors.

The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies. By Neil Fligstein. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. Pp. xiv+274. $35.00.

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Neil Fligstein's new book is the first major work to integrate and refine the "new economic sociology." This subfield, which has only recently been added to the list of approved sections in the American Sociological Association, is not yet two decades old. Mark Granovetter's 1985 article ("Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness" *American Journal of Sociology* 91:481–510) is usually seen as the theoretical inspiration that gave new meaning to an old area of sociological interest; several edited readers purporting to encircle the subject matter of the subfield soon followed; and then, in *The Handbook of Economic Sociology* (Princeton University Press, 1994), Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg put together commissioned chapters laying out the length and breadth of the subfield. Besides these benchmarks, many recently published articles and monographs emphasize one or another aspect of this rapidly emerging area of study. Until the appearance of Fligstein's new book, however, no one has attempted to integrate economic sociology into a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive approach for the study of market capitalism. This book, therefore, sets a standard for others books that will follow in the coming decades. By all measures, it is an impressive book that deserves careful reading by everyone interested in the analysis of capitalist economies. However, as I will outline below, the book omits many sociological aspects of capitalist markets that I personally find most fascinating.

The core focus of the book is to provide a theoretical foundation for a sociology of markets. Arguing that "the sociology of markets lacks a theory of social institutions" (p. 8), Fligstein contends that his approach addresses

and provides answers for the fundamental theoretical questions that constitute the sociological study of capitalist markets. He calls his theoretical framework the "political-cultural approach" and further claims that his way of defining the field is at odds with economic theory, which he loosely equates with the neoclassical view of perfectly competitive markets.

The "political-cultural approach" is supposedly not a theory about markets per se, but is rather what Fligstein calls "a unified framework" (p. 20), within which the sociological theories about capitalist markets can be developed. The first half of the book, consisting of three core chapters, is devoted to explaining the three constitutive dimensions of his approach and to offering discrete sets of theoretical propositions that go along with these dimensions. The second half of the book, consisting of five substantive chapters, most of which have been previously published, provides some case studies to illustrate the usefulness of the approach.

The political-cultural approach is, in essence, a framing device used to structure theoretical observations about capitalist markets. The first dimension of the framework is to recognize markets as institutions consisting of "self-reproducing role structures" in which rules, routines, and relationships provide stability for market activity. The second dimension is to see markets institutions as outcomes of historical struggles in which the political winners create and stabilize market institutions in order to maintain competitive advantages for themselves within the marketplace. The third and most important dimension is to view the entire market arena as a "field" of activity that is systematically controlled internally and directly by dominant firms and externally and indirectly by the state. The key purpose of these interlocking controls is to socially construct a system of market stability. Although his analysis is often rich and insightful, the recurring theme running through these key chapters is the simple idea that the most important focus for a sociology of markets is the analysis of market stability.

Theories, of course, are embedded in a perspective. Fligstein is no exception in this regard. Although he calls his framework an "approach," it also leads directly to the theories and propositions that he develops. Defining market stability as the unifying theme, Fligstein unsurprisingly concludes political forces, predominately those of the state, and local culture, constituted primarily by dominant firms, are the two chief factors in creating market stability, and hence the two defining features of the political-cultural approach. The circularity in the argument is obvious and disconcerting, and it colors the whole book.

In the second half of the book, Fligstein illustrates his approach by examining a range of topics that highlights market stability, such as systems of employment, corporate ownership in the United States, the merger movement, the structures of corporate control, the notion of shareholder value, and globalization. The theme that runs through these illustrative chapters is the fact that market stability is institutionally rooted in national economies. The logic of employment, property rights, and conceptions of

The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol. By Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan, and Ingemar Rexed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975. Pp. xiv+338. $12.50 (cloth); $5.95 (paper).

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Drug control policies have always been integral factors in the patterns and effects of drug use. Recent historical research leaves little doubt that there is no necessary relationship between the severity of controls and the potential for abuse or social injury of any form of drug use. That the voluminous drug literature in social science consists largely of studies on abusers and ill effects is a phenomenon sociologists of knowledge will someday ponder. When drug controls are examined at all they are often taken for granted as natural responses to "drug problems" rather than as legitimate objects of inquiry in their own right.

In *The Gentlemen's Club,* Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan, and Ingemar Rexed take an important step toward a critical understanding of the origins and consequences of international attempts to regulate the use of drugs. Using convention memoranda, treaty drafts, United Nations resolutions, and a host of other documentary data, they reconstruct the evolution of international drug policies from the Shanghai Conference of 1909 to the 1971 Vienna Convention. In the process we are offered several chapters of rich if imposing historical detail on the structures, goals, and operations of the key organizations that shaped that evolution. These are followed by five fascinating case studies of particular forms of drug control and a discussion of findings and recommendations. Because the book is a precisely delimited and technical historical study it is not for general sociological readership. Nonetheless, it should be of interest not only to students of drug use and social policy but also to political scientists and sociologists of law and social control.

Although Bruun, Pan, and Rexed employ a scholarly style, it is a sordid tale they tell. They situate the production of drugs and attempts to control use in the worldwide political-economic context. By so doing, they uncover an astounding array of incidents in which the goal of easing human suffering is sacrificed to the economic, bureaucratic, and professional interests of a self-selecting and self-serving elite. When it suited Western industrial powers, strict regulations were placed on drugs from developing nations. Yet when controls on manufactured pharmaceuticals were considered, it was decided that "free trade" should not be hampered. Whereas alcohol caused aggressiveness among Africans and thus required prohibition there, it accounted for many of the "sturdy qualities" of the French and so required only mild regulation elsewhere. On the basis of shoddy evidence, cannabis and coca were thought to cause murder and mental illness; but despite mounting evidence of abuse and ill effects, real controls on barbiturates were avoided so as not to "deprive numerous people of their sleep."

While pharmaceutical industry lobbyists got the diplomatic red carpet, dissenting voices and inconvenient evidence were suppressed. When moral and economic interests coincided it was apt to be a drug's properties that caused problems, but when they were in conflict, as in the case of amphetamines, "human weakness," rather than the drug, was thought to be at issue (at least according to the Swiss delegate to the United Nations who doubled as a pharmaceutical executive for Hoffman-LaRoche).

When drugs are knowingly misclassified to suit professional and bureaucratic needs, when conceptions of drug problems are shaped by political power rather than empirical experience, and when the insularity and hypocrisy of the "Gentlemen's Club" is camouflaged by a cloak of scientific legitimacy, one can expect to find, as these authors do, that the international control system has been largely ineffective. And this to the detriment of any real understanding of drug use or the amelioration of its harmful social consequences.

The orderly documentation of this history is the strength of the book. There are weaknesses. Given their demonstration of how ill-founded and prejudicial conceptions shaped policy, I was left thirsting for more theoretical analysis of why such conceptions were accepted so uncritically. Moreover, since the authors focus on why international controls took particular *forms,* they offer scant examination of the basic assumptions and motivations behind controls in general. Since drug use is nearly a cultural universal and its control bears little relationship to social harm, one wants to know something of the conditions under which national elites perceive such drug use as threatening.

Bruun, Pan, and Rexed touch on theory by noting how all organizations maintain legitimacy through myth and mystification, and by analyzing the instrumental and structural sources of Western power just beneath the pluralist exterior of the United Nations. However, this does not fully confront the political-economic roots of drug control beyond their direct links with the international bodies under study. Part of this shyness about theory may stem from their rigorous adherence to data. Yet one suspects that it followed as well from their intent—which was *not* to build a theory on *why* states of the world attempt to control states of consciousness but, rather, to *improve* their ability to do so. But such theory building may entail another book. And since the one they have written is already a solid reference for such purposes, these criticisms are in part a plea for a second volume.